Moreover, this approach shows us how neutrality was (re-)defined in this period, both by neutral countries themselves and by the belligerent powers. These findings thus help us understand ideas about belligerency and neutrality in the period of the two world wars.
During the First World War the famous Dutch poet Albert Verwey wrote that the war was constantly on his mind and the minds of many others: their thoughts were irresistibly drawn to it, like iron to a magnet. 2 Although the Netherlands was one of the few remaining neutral countries, Verwey stressed the impact the war had on him, his Dutch contemporaries and their society. The war that started in August 1914 immediately sparked debate in the Netherlands.
Not only the causes of its origin and which of the great powers was most to blame for the outbreak of war was heavily discussed, but also the most appropriate reaction of the Dutch people and Dutch state. Notwithstanding the unanimous view that the Netherlands should try to remain neutral, there was much dispute about what the role of the country could and should be.
In this paper I will analyze how public debate on the position and identity of the Netherlands developed in the course of the First World War. 3 The Netherlands was one of the very few countries to remain neutral during the entire war period. Until recently the First World War has therefore received comparatively little attention in Dutch historiography.
Unlike the Second World War with its devastating impact on Dutch society, its predecessor was defined as 'the war that did not happen', and it was supposed not to have caused any important social or political changes. This view resulted in the idea that in the Netherlands the nineteenth century lasted until 1940 when the country was pulled back into history by the German invader. 4 It also produced a habit of regarding the decades before 1940 as a 'pre-history' of the Second World War, which should be analyzed by anachronistically assessing who was 'good' and who was 'bad', much in the same way as the period of 1940-1945. 5 This approach has distorted not only our understanding of Dutch society, but also of neutrality in general before the Second World War.
Dutch neutrality in 1914 was an uninterrupted legacy from the early nineteenth century and was further enshrined by the Peace Conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907.
The First World War became its first serious challenge. Neutrality is, in effect, a function of war: international law defines neutrality as the status of third states that, at the outbreak of war, adopt a position of non-belligerency or abstention from hostilities. 6 States can have various reasons to remain neutral. In this respect small neutral states are distinctly different from neutral great powers: whereas the latter can more or less independently decide whether or not to engage in the war, a small neutral state is in a far more vulnerable position. It can try to balance between the belligerents or seek protection. In the Netherlands the latter option was avoided for fear of a loss of independence. A small neutral state is exposed to the powers of both sides and therefore has to uphold friendly relations with both sides in order to avoid violation of its neutrality.
During the First World War the Dutch did not fight, kill, die, or in any way suffer to the extent any of the belligerents did. Accordingly, the chief problems and questions raised by Smit, C. Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1899 -1919 ), vol. I. 1899 -1914 . II. 1914 -1917 . III. 1917 -1919 (Groningen: 1972 -1973 
Identity discussed
In the belligerent states, opinion makers were of major importance to convince the people that the nation's ideals were at stake in this war. In a neutral country like the Netherlands there was a specific form of cultural mobilization, in this case to mobilize the people for neutrality.
Because there was no official propaganda organization or censorship, public debate developed into one of the main theatres for Dutch cultural mobilization during the First World War. In terms of intensity and purposes this specific cultural mobilization was obviously very different from its counterparts in neighboring societies. Identifying the specific characteristics of this 'neutral cultural mobilization' is one of the objectives of this paper.
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Our main focus is on the discussion of Dutch identity and the Dutch position by opinion makers in the leading periodicals. Opinion makers are defined more broadly than just intellectuals or journalists: in order to avoid listing the usual suspects, a more promising approach is to start by looking at the relevant articles in the contemporary journals and in this way selecting the writers on the subject that were important at the time. The criterion for selection was the subject discussed in the article, not the name of the writer.
These Dutch opinion makers turn out to have lost their initial self-confidence as defenders of (international) law and justice. During the middle years of the war they were toying with the idea of a specific role for the Dutch nation. In the end they were left with great uncertainty about the Dutch identity: in the last stages of the war not only the Dutch international and economic position, but also Dutch self-confidence with regard to aspirations as a bringer of peace had severely deteriorated. It became widely accepted that the main task of the Dutch was to try to understand the developments in the world and to adjust to them. This is clarified by the way in which further democratization was discussed.
Dutch debate during the First World War can thus be divided into three different parts, each dominated chronologically by a different major issue used by Dutch opinion leaders in their attempts to define the Dutch identity and position in the world: Law and Justice, Peace, and Democracy.
Law and Justice
In the early months of the war the violation of Belgian neutrality was at the heart of Dutch It was widely believed by Dutch opinion makers that the belligerents had lost their power of discrimination so that the neutrals had the task to safeguard objectivity and reason.
Especially in the early stages of the war, the German colleagues were reproached for having lost their senses. Dutch opinion makers soon complained about the enormous amounts of letters and pamphlets they were receiving from German acquaintances and colleagues, and especially about the style in which the Germans addressed them. 10 They were shocked to see that eminent German scholars simply denied the violation of Belgian neutrality and justified the idea of the necessity of war. 11 To the utter horror of Dutch jurists they even used references to international law -Dutch icons of neutrality theory like Hugo Grotius included -to make their point. 12 Apart from this disappointment in German scholarship and sciencewhich had an enormous reputation in the Netherlands -German Kultur in general now seemed to be exposed as mere brutality and militarism.
In contrast to the bewildering letters and pamphlets from Germany, British views of the war were much more easily assimilated by many Dutch opinion makers. They actually copied British concepts, for instance by frequently using the notion of 'Prussianism' or 'Prussian militarism' in the same way their British colleagues did; suddenly they also began speaking of the 'unholy trinity' of Bernhardi, Treitschke and Hegel (or Nietzsche).
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Pamphlets written by Dutch authors under secret authority of the British propaganda office
were not publicly denounced as propaganda but regarded as genuinely Dutch, whereas publications advocating the German point of view were often denounced, sometimes undeservedly, as secret propaganda. 14 Struycken's articles on the German invasion of Belgium, for instance, were used by British propaganda and translated into English, but the single voice that repudiated Struycken as an 'Allied agent' was ignored because he was regarded as a German agent himself.
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The similarities between the British and the Dutch discourse thus seem manifest in the early stages of the war. Dutch domestic conditions created a framework in which the abovementioned concepts could function. Still, they were defined in a completely different context, and British cultural mobilization (and propaganda) increasingly restricted the usefulness of these concepts for Dutch opinion makers.
In Britain, international law, justice, and civilization in general were presented as, and believed to be, the chief reasons why the country was at war. Official British propaganda in the early days of the war was mainly directed towards the neutrals. 'Wellington House' 20 Feb.1916 , 27 Feb. 1916 adopted as one of its leading principles that the neutrals were in no way to be given the impression that the British were trying to convert them. They wanted the presentation of facts to be central in their approach: facts accompanied by 'general remarks based on these facts'.
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This of course does not mean that British propaganda was always based on actual facts.
Sometimes it clearly was not, for instance with regard to many stories of atrocities. that it became increasingly difficult for the Dutch to use these concepts to describe their own identity as being neutral. Law and justice became principles of this war, the very reasons why the Allies were fighting. It followed logically that a neutral state simply could not call itself the champion of these principles.
In the Dutch debate adherence to the principles of law and justice therefore came to mean that one was siding with the Allies. In the course of 1915 it was no longer a convincing way to define a neutral identity. However, these concepts were not only lost because British The interesting thing, however, is the way Van Hamel framed his accusations. He not so much criticized German politics, he issued warnings to the Dutch public and politicians.
He was urging them to be suspicious of propaganda that would make the Dutch forget their own interests and turn them into a tool in the hands of foreign powers. In this period the belligerents' slogans had already come to be regarded by Dutch opinion makers as deceitful attempts to confuse the Dutch people and persuade them that foreign interests coincided with their own. There were quite a few people who, like Van Hamel, saw such 'evil machinations' especially on the German side. They concluded that whatever one thought of British propaganda, it was plain to see that the true Dutch interests were on their side: balance of power, free trade, and liberal politics were the obvious examples. Van Hamel claimed that this judgment had nothing to do with being anti-German: it was simply common sense for a Dutchman to hope that the Allies would win. A rather successful line in this discourse was to define a Dutch role based on its specific national characteristics. The key to the success of this concept lay in the fact that the idea of a special Dutch character that might help pacify the belligerents functioned as a 'third way' option: it was an escape from the polarization at home and abroad. This also meant, however, that discussions with their belligerent colleagues often became subject to misunderstanding and disappointment. This is especially true for discussions between Dutch opinion makers and their British counterparts. 26 On the other hand it now seemed possible to re-establish contact with the Germans.
Central to this 'third way' approach was the idea that pluralism was the solution for
Europe and that the Dutch were in an eminent position to teach others what pluralism meant.
The reasoning behind this idea can be found very plainly in the writings of F.C. Gerretson, a poet, civil servant, businessman and conservative protestant politician all in one. Gerretson was an eloquent writer with a large -secret -network. At the end of 1915 he started his own journal that focused on the idea of a 'Greater Netherlands', which was officially a cultural goal aimed at fostering literary contacts with Flanders. Gerretson, however, also had ideas about a Germanic 'Bund', which he wisely kept to himself. During the war years the process of 'pacification' of these different groups was politically more or less settled. This fostered the peculiar Dutch organization of society and politics into a framework that was later called 'Pillarization' (Verzuiling).
The fact that the Dutch seemed to be able to work out some sense of unity in spite of deep religious and social-economic divisions, fostered contemporary ideas that this must be due to a specific Dutch quality. Gerretson himself used to refer to the fact that Dutch culture not only featured Rembrandt but Rubens too, thereby also stressing the unity of Holland and Flanders.
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The specific Dutch quality thus came to be defined as the successful integration of apparently hostile elements. The logic of reasoning adopted by Gerretson and many others suggested that all groups (or nations) should accept each other as fundamentally different and that it was both impossible and undesirable to persuade others to abandon their specific inherited values. The solution was not to force any other nation to adopt values that did not suit its characteristics, since that would only lead to degeneration and war. In Dutch public debate pluralism and tolerance therefore went hand in hand with the acceptance of and a growing belief in fundamental or even inherited national and ethnic characteristics. This opened up discussions with Germany.
As the war dragged on, Germany's strategy focused on securing victory by weakening the enemy's alliances and seeking separate peace treaties. 30 This resulted in appeals for peace negotiations, which caused a change in attitude towards Germany in Dutch public debate: in the eyes of many Dutch opinion makers this was a sign that the Germans were regaining a sense of rationality. The Allied rejection of German peace proposals on the other hand increased their annoyance with these obstinate belligerents. In spite of their suspicions about the German objectives, Dutch opinion makers at the time mostly hoped for a negotiated peace and accordingly wanted the German peace proposals to be taken seriously.
This attitude meant a new chance for German propaganda. German officials and semiofficials with contacts in the Netherlands had increasingly tried to distance themselves from their stigmatized 'friends' who ran De Toekomst. Thanks to the slightly changing climate they could now try to convince Dutch intellectuals, politicians and academics by referring to the necessity of re-establishing European peace and international contacts. Of course one of the ideas behind this policy was the German fear of total isolation; but in addition to hard economic reasons, ideas of Dutch-German kinship also played a role. and some of the Dutch colleagues would be invited to come to Germany. 31 Brinckmann assured them that these visits would have nothing to do with propaganda: science and scholarship should speak for themselves. And after all, in their circles it was considered a scientific truth that a close Dutch-German relationship was only natural, since they shared the same Germanic origins.
The Dutch professors he appealed to proved easy to persuade: Brinckmann's words suited their framework of internationalism and impartiality and they were naturally flattered to be treated as their famous German colleagues' equals. In the first months of 1918 some prominent German academics actually visited the Netherlands, among them Hans Delbrück, Hermann Oncken and Lujo Brentano. The whole scheme had been kept a secret and in Dutch reviews the lectures were highly praised and welcomed. Brinckmann wrote to his superiors in
Berlin that even the 'anti-German' professor Niermeijer was excited after hearing Delbrück's lecture.
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In this report, however, Brinckmann also set out his hidden agenda which he had not even revealed to his Dutch friends: the creation of closer relations with fellow Germanic peoples in order to advance Germanic co-operation. 33 His purpose was to put the Dutch at ease and to prevent any impression of coercion or being regarded as unimportant. That was why some Dutch scholars were also invited to come to Germany. It was merely a gesture, witness the ample correspondence in the archives on the troubling issue of how to find a public willing to attend these lectures: nobody in Germany had ever heard of the Dutch Many opinion makers made their own plans and drew up schemes for decentralization and bottom-up organization. 41 These concepts were, in different ways, traditionally important in Calvinist, Roman Catholic and Social Democratic social thinking. They were in line with the dominant idea that fundamentally different groups should be given maximum autonomy.
On the whole one might say that these opinion leaders proposed a kind of corporatist organization that was believed to combine true democracy and political and social-economic harmony. This new organization was also supposed to increase government accountability. In effect this discussion raised the question of political legitimacy. Unlike the belligerent governments the Dutch cabinet never really tried to secure its own legitimacy, nor set up a propaganda organization. The counterpart of the state's abstention from intervention in public debate was a growing habit of preventing public debate -or even parliament! -from interfering with politics. Since there was no military war effort the Dutch political elite could get away with this. But the harsh critique in public debate shows that even relatively modest economic and political problems caused by the war could provoke a serious decline in trust.
From the point of view of Dutch government it might have been wiser to initiate some sort of state-led cultural mobilization.
Conclusion: a shaken self image
Dutch public debate during the First World War was highly receptive and responsive to the spin-off from cultural mobilization in the belligerent societies. All the same, Dutch opinion makers were trying to uphold a strong sense of Dutch identity. Concepts such as law and justice were largely lost, but the focus on pluralism and on tolerance of supposedly fundamental differences seems to have been a fairly successful alternative way of describing Dutch identity -at least in the domestic discussion, where it merged with ideas regarding democratization.
But in the international public sphere the identity of a neutral state had changed as well: the neutral was no longer regarded as the moral judge who had to be won over. Since the war had developed into a war of attrition, sacrifice determined the meaning of the war.
Neutrals were no longer neutrals, but non-belligerents: they did not sacrifice and thus had no say with regard to the moral values in this war, let alone about peace conditions.
Dutch public debate showed features of a process of cultural self-mobilization -from the cries for national unity with their various concomitant visions of the nation to the building
